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1 Introduction 
“The world economy is fitfully getting back to normal, but it will be a “new 
normal”.” 
   The Economist, 3rd October 2009 
 
Potential output and the output gap, derived from the concept of potential output, 
are key indicators for fiscal and monetary policy. For politicians, responsible for 
economic policy measures, estimations of potential output and the output gap are 
of great importance to evaluate the development of the business cycle and the 
macroeconomic performance of a country. The political programs often depend 
on the development of potential output. 
Estimates of potential output and the output gap are used by the European Union 
(EU) in their macroeconomic surveillance procedures. Especially in the Stability 
and Growth Pact, which should ensure that the Member States of the euro area 
maintain the budgetary discipline, the output gap is used for calculating indicators 
of cyclical adjusted fiscal balance.1 These indicators are used in turn for 
assessing the observation of the convergence criteria and therefore are very 
useful indicators of the fiscal policy stance.2 
Concerning the monetary policy, the concept of potential output and the output 
gap are key indicators for the European Central Bank (ECB). The primary 
objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is ensuring price stability in the euro area. 
In order to evaluate all the relevant information that is important for assessing the 
risks to inflation the ECB’s policy actions are based on the “two pillars”, economic 
                                               
1
 Cyclical adjusted fiscal balance is thereby the one that would occur when output were at 
its potential level. 
2
 See European Commission (2001) 
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analysis and monetary analysis3. For both analytical perspectives the concept of 
potential output is of great relevance. For example, a positive output gap (actual 
is above the potential production level), often occurring in boom periods, implies 
an overheating of the economy and thus is an indicator for inflationary pressure. 
Thus, as the central banks use the output gap as one of the leading indicators of 
inflation and thus monetary policy, achieving good estimates of potential output is 
of great interest for the ECB. Orphanides (2000) showed that the systematic 
mismeasurement of the output gap in the 1960’s and 1970’s led to inappropriate 
activist stabilization policy and therefore was the main factor of the Great inflation 
in the 1970’s in the United States. 
With the bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers on the 15th of 
September the most severe downturn since the great depression in the 1930’s 
started. In the short-run the crisis led to a strong fall in the potential output level 
due to negative effects on all input factors of production. The post crisis 
development in the medium-and long-run are, however, less clear. The 
theoretical cases are a full recovery-, a permanent loss- and an increasing loss 
over time scenario. Which scenario will be more likely heavily depends on the 
policy programs implemented and the effects on the input factors (labor, capital 
and total factor productivity). 
In the theoretical and empirical analysis in this thesis I describe the effects of the 
current crisis on potential output and its input factors. Thereby I concentrate only 
on the euro area. By varying the assumptions about the medium-term 
development of total factor productivity, whereby the assumptions are based on 
the theoretical analysis of the policy programs implemented by the euro area 
countries, it is shown that the recovery scenario of potential output in the post-
crisis period heavily depends on this input factor. Dependent on the assumption I 
could simulate all three theoretical cases. Regarding the policy actions taken, the 
most plausible case is a permanent loss in potential output level. 
The diploma thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 shortly explains the 
concept of potential output, output growth and the output gap. It also gives a 
broad overview of the most important methods used to estimate potential output. 
                                               
3
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Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical effects of economic crises on the input 
factors (labor, capital and total factor productivity) of the production function. 
Furthermore the policy responses of the euro area countries in the current crisis 
and their impact on the input factors are analyzed. Chapter 4 is the empirical part 
of the thesis. First, two different methods are used in order to get own estimates 
of potential output. In the last section of the chapter three medium-term 
scenarios, which differ in the assumption about the future development of total 
factor productivity, are performed. The last chapter of the thesis concludes and 
gives an outlook for further research.     
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2 Potential output, potential growth and the output 
gap 
Potential output is usually defined as a measure of how much the economy could 
and would produce under hypothetical conditions of full utilization of all factors of 
production. In general, Arthur M. Okun’s speech on the annual conference of the 
American Statistic Association (1962) about the significance and measurement of 
potential Gross National Product (GNP) is considered as the beginning of the 
development of methods for calculating potential output. According to Okun 
(1962), potential output can be understood as the macroeconomic production 
level without inflationary pressure. Thus potential output, as a supply concept, 
depends on the quality and quantity of the input factors, labor and capital, and on 
the state of technology of an economy. Higher levels of the input factors lead to a 
higher level of potential output.  
Two other important economic indicators (potential growth and the output gap) 
can be derived from the idea of potential output. Potential growth is defined as 
the growth rates of the levels of potential output.  
The output gap is the percentage deviation of the actual economic output level 
from the potential output level and thus measures the degree of utilization of the 
production factors in the economy. As potential output is the production level with 
stable inflation a positive output gap can be interpreted as the part of the output 
subjected to inflationary pressure. On the opposite a negative output gap can be 
an indicator for lower inflation rates or an upcoming deflation. As the potential 
output can be seen as the equilibrium level a positive or negative output gap 
means that the economy is somehow running at an inefficient rate. 
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2.1 Estimating potential output4 
Potential output cannot be observed directly and thus has to be estimated using 
other economic variables that are available. The economic literature describes a 
variety of different approaches. This paper only briefly gives a broad overview of 
the different approaches. For more details see Hauptmeier (2009). 
The methods can be classified in various ways. In this paper the methods are 
grouped into the two main categories: univariate and multivariate methods of 
calculating potential output. The evaluation of the most appropriate method has 
to be done on the basis of different criteria. The methods differ in their complexity 
of calculation, in their data needs for the calculation process and their reliability. 
The timeliness of the data also plays an important role for the choice of the right 
method. In general, the univariate methods in contrast to the multivariate ones 
are characterized by a high level of practicability. However, the reliability of the 
estimates is assumed to be bigger when using the multivariate methods. 
 
2.1.1 Univariate methods 
The univariate method only takes into account historical values of the target 
variables (in this case GDP). Most of the methods use some kind of filtering 
techniques with the aim of fitting trend lines to observed time series. The problem 
using this method is that it projects past values into the future without regarding 
that potential output is also determined by future expectations. However, the 
advantage of this kind of method is the relative simple practicability and the low 
data needs. However, the reliability of these methods is doubtful as other 
observable economic variables that influence potential output are not taken into 
account. 
                                               
4
 See: Hauptmeier (2009), pp. 87-99 
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2.1.1.1 Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP-Filter) 
This technical method is widely used, because it is very simple and it only 
requires output data for estimating potential output. It finds the value for potential 
output () that minimizes the difference between actual and potential output, 
imposing constraints on the extent to which growth in potential output can vary.  
 
Using the HP-filter the following expression is minimized: 
min	
       	      	 
	


	
 
,   being the potential and actual output respectively in time t. 
The first term of the equation is the square of the difference between actual and 
potential output. It keeps the trend close to the observations. The second term 
reflects the square of the change in potential output growth and keeps the trend 
smooth. The central parameter in this equation, the relative weight of the two 
terms of the equation, is the so – called smoothing parameter λ, which is 
determined outside the model with values from zero to infinite. The choice of λ 
depends on the frequency of observations. (λ=1600 for quarterly and λ=100 for 
end-of-the-year data have become established).  
Other univariate methods for estimating potential output, using some kind of 
filtering technique are the “Baxter-King” filter and the “Christiano-Fitzgerald” filter, 
which both belong to the “band-pass filters. For a further discussion see 
Bjørnland, Brubakk, and Jore (2005).  
The main problem using filtering methods is the so-called end-point problem. To 
deal with this problem, the actual reference output series is being forecasted into 
the future. Thus, on the one hand the quality of the estimates of potential output 
and the output gap mainly depends on the quality of these forecasts. But on the 
other hand the current estimates of the output gaps influence the forecasts of 
GDP. The relation between the two variables is therefore a vicious cycle. 
Especially in times of turning points in the economic cycle the use of the HP-filter 
in order to get estimations of current potential output is problematic. Although a 
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change of the trend in the real GDP series can already be assumed, the HP-filter 
will not take this into account in a proper way.  
2.1.2 Multivariate methods 
The main idea of the multivariate methods is that there exists a relationship 
between a change in GDP and a change in other economic variables that can be 
observed. Here in this paper the production function (PF) method and the 
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models, the two most important 
representatives of this category, will be described. The main advantage of these 
methods is the higher reliability compared to the univariate methods as 
observable economic variables are taken into account. However, the calculation 
process is often quite complex as it is based upon economic models.  
2.1.2.1 Production Function (PF) Approach 
This method is widely used by international organizations such as the OECD, 
IMF or the European Commission to derive estimates of potential output. It is 
based on the assumption that a macroeconomic production function describes 
the connection between GDP and the input factors capital, labor and 
technological progress. Potential output is calculated by estimating a production 
function and then replacing its input factors by their potential values. There are a 
number of different functional forms of production functions. The one used most 
is the “Cobb-Douglas” production function. The advantage of this approach, 
compared to the univariate methods, using some kind of filtering methods, is that 
the reasons for changes in potential output can be explained by the key 
economic forces. The effects of structural changes and policies on potential 
output can thus be analyzed. The main disadvantage is that the method still uses 
some kind of filtering method as the HP-filter, mentioned above, to determine the 
potential input factors. So the end-point problem still features here. There is also 
a data problem when using this method, as measures of capital stock may often 
be of poor quality and so not very reliable. In summary, the production function 
method is superior to the univariate methods because they provide economic 
explanations for developments in potential output.  
Potential output, potential growth and the output gap 
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2.1.2.2 Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) Model 
Potential output in this case is estimated by using information from a number of 
highly correlated variables, such as GDP, unemployment and domestic inflation. 
Many modifications to the standard approach by Blanchard and Quah (1989) can 
be found in the literature. The SVAR model has the advantage that it imposes 
relatively few constraints on the relationship between the variables. The models 
are based on economic theory and thus not arbitrary determined. Another 
advantage is that there is no end-point problem using this method for estimating 
potential output. The main disadvantage, compared to the PF-method, is that the 
central variables that influence potential output cannot be identified. Furthermore, 
it is a non-transparent method and compared to the HP-filter method more 
complicated and can therefore not be executed very quickly. 
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3 Potential output and financial crises 
Financial crises are usually followed by deep recessions in the economy. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) studied the aftermath of severe financial crises, 
including emerging economies. Their investigations showed that financial crises 
lead to large losses in output and employment. There is an average peak to 
trough decline in output by 9.3 percentage points with an average duration of 1.9 
years. Regarding the recent financial crisis of 2008 output declined by 4.1% in 
the euro area and 4.2% in the EU 27 in the year 2009.5 At that time it seems that 
the recovery programs have been effective and the output could increase again 
in the year 2010 in the euro area. However the prospects for the following year 
are of great uncertainty. The financial downturn has not fully affected the labor 
market yet and the impact of the crisis on public finances is still to be faced. So a 
further negative loop cannot be ruled out. If the euro area should be out of 
recession there are still important questions to answer: Will the recent loss in 
GDP levels be easily recouped? Will the economy return to its “before crisis” 
potential output level? What are the effects of the financial crisis on the long-run 
potential growth?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 European Commission (2010c) 
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Three different scenarios for the impact of a financial crisis on potential output 
level and growth are possible:6 
 
  Case 1                                                   Case 2 
 
          Case 3 
 
Figure 1: Three possible theoretical cases7  
 
                                               
6
 European Commission (2009a) 
7
 European Commission (2009a), p. 11 
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It seems to be inevitable that in the short run there will be a drop in the potential 
output level as a consequence of the current financial crisis. This is very likely 
due to the reduction in the productive capital stock and the negative effect on 
labor supply and structural unemployment. So all three cases account for the 
short run drop in potential output level. 
• Case one shows the full recovery scenario where the potential growth rate 
is higher after the crisis is over and so the economy can recover all the 
lost output of the drop in the short run. In the long run the economy will 
return to its “before crisis” potential output growth path.  
• The second possible scenario states that there will be a permanent loss in 
potential output level. The long-run potential growth rate after the crisis 
will return to its initial rate and so the short run drop in the GDP level 
cannot be compensated.  
• The third scenario finally shows the worst case for an economy. A proper 
recovery from the crisis is not possible, leading to a lower growth of 
potential output after the crisis. So the loss in GDP level is increasing over 
time. This certainly implies severe damages for the economy and thus all 
necessary actions have to be taken in order to avoid such a scenario. 
Taking a closer look at recoveries following a banking crisis, each of the three 
possible scenarios can be found in the recent history. Sweden, Finland and 
Japan suffered from a banking crisis in the early 1990’s. Sweden’s post-crisis 
potential output growth exceeded the pre-crisis rate and so was able to fully 
recover the losses in the output level. A kind of mixture between the first and the 
second scenario described above can be found in Finland in 1991. At the 
beginning of the recovery their post-crisis potential growth rate was as high as 
the pre-crisis one, but increasing slowly. In the end Finland was able to recover 
the losses in potential output but not as quickly as Sweden did it. Finally, the 
recovery of Japan is an example for a lower growth of potential GDP growth after 
the crisis and so the loss in level was increasing over time. 
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Figure 2: Level in actual (Y) and potential (YP) output of Finalnd, Sweden and 
Japan8 
So the crucial question to be answered is why the recovery process in Sweden 
and Finland worked quite well but not so in Japan. Which policy programs should 
be taken in order to boost potential output growth after a recession? To answer 
this question it is important to thoroughly understand the impact of the crisis on 
potential output level/growth and therefore a detailed theoretical analysis of its 
components (labor, capital and total factor productivity) will be done in the next 
chapter.  
3.1 Expected theoretical impact of financial crises on the 
input factors 
According to the production function method the three input factors labor, capital 
and total factor productivity determine the level, and the growth, of potential 
                                               
8
 European Commission (2009a), p. 23 
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output. Severe financial crisis, like the recent one in 2008, often negatively affect 
potential output growth through all three input channels. It is, however, not that 
clear what the long-run effects on potential growth are. If the right policy 
programs are being taken the possible negative impact of the crisis in the long 
run can be prevented and a strong recovery is feasible. Thus, the different policy 
programs of Finland, as the positive example, will be compared with the ones of 
Japan, as the negative example. However, one has to bear in mind that not all 
programs that are good for one country also have to lead to a strong recovery in 
other countries. Though, the positive examples can in some sense give 
indications about the most effective policy actions for countries affected by the 
crisis. At last, however, the policy responses have to be adjusted for each country 
and each crisis separately. 
3.1.1 Labor input 
Economic crises are always associated with declines in employment. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), analyzing the aftermath of severe financial crises, found out 
that on average unemployment rises for almost five years, with an increase in the 
unemployment rate of about seven percentage points. The duration in the decline 
in employment is noticeable as it lasts on average about three years longer than 
the downturn in real GDP. Regarding the current financial crisis, the OECD 
estimated in November 2009, that the unemployment rate in the euro area will 
rise in the years 2009 – 2011, achieving 10.8% of labor force in the year 2011 
(see Figure 3). 
Potential output and financial crises 
14 
 
 
Figure 3 : Rising unemployment rate in the euro area 
 
Standard macroeconomic models distinguish between the actual and the 
equilibrium (=structural) unemployment rate. The structural unemployment rate is 
defined as the rate of unemployment consistent with stable inflation (NAIRU: 
Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). 
Regarding labor supply it is very likely that there is a temporary increase in the 
short-term NAIRU during the recession period due to the slow reallocation 
process in the economy and the sluggish adjustment in prices and wages. So in 
the short run there will be some negative effects on trend participation rate and 
on the trend hours worked. These labor inputs should come back to its pre-crisis 
level if the crisis is short and wrong policy actions are avoided. This would leave 
the NAIRU in the long run and therefore the potential growth path unchanged.9 
However, by weakening the labor market situation financial crisis can also lead to 
an increase in long-term structural unemployment. There are a number of 
empirical studies that try to find out the main driving forces of the NAIRU. The 
structural unemployment rate is only determined by labor market institutions and 
real rigidities but not affected by the actual unemployment rate.10 Blanchard and 
                                               
9
 see European Commission (2009a) 
10
 See: European Commission (2009a) 
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Summers (1986) were among the first who embodied the idea that the 
equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the history of the actual 
unemployment rate. Such theories are called hysteresis theories. Hysteresis 
could possibly be explained by “insiders”, who already are employed, and 
“outsiders”, who are not employed, in the context of wage bargaining. Workers 
losing their jobs in turn also lose their ability to compete for jobs with the 
“insiders”. Mainly long term unemployment may cause a permanent destruction in 
human capital due to a deterioration of skills. Unlike the short term unemployed 
they do no longer compete for a job with the “insiders”. Thus, the extent on the 
downward pressure of wages due to the high unemployment is reduced resulting 
in persistence in unemployment. This can cause a long-lasting loss in potential 
output. 
It is quite ambiguous what the effects of prolonged economic downturns are on 
the labor force participation. On the one hand the “discouraged worker effect” 
states that the high unemployment rate discourages vulnerable workers from 
seeking a new position. Mainly groups that are disadvantaged in the labor 
market, like women with children, low skilled workers or the youth and older 
people, are affected by this effect. Pichelman and Elmeskov (1993) found 
evidence that the “discouraged worker effect” can be significant. On the other 
hand the “additional worker effect” says that the loss of income due to the crisis 
can encourage second income earners to enter the labor force. There is also 
evidence that particularly for females this effect is important. A possible further 
reduction of the labor force participation rate can derive from bad policy 
decisions. Governments can set social and financial incentives to keep potential 
working forces away from the labor market, like making early retirements 
attractive to older people or encouraging the youth to study longer. Taking such 
actions should be avoided because on the one hand they are very expensive and 
on the other hand they even cannot solve the unemployment problem in the long 
run. 
There is quite a clear consensus in the economic literature that structural 
unemployment is affected by real rigidities and institutional settings. Empirical 
studies find evidence that unemployment benefits, tax wedges, trade unions, the 
real interest rate and thus the cost of capital, employment protection legislation 
Potential output and financial crises 
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(EPL), labor market policies, product market regulations (PMR) and the minimum 
wage affect structural unemployment.  
A higher unemployment benefit improves the situation for workers in the case 
that they lose their jobs. For those who are already unemployed the incentives to 
search effectively for a new job decline and thus the downward pressure on the 
wages by competing with the employed workers falls. In both cases higher 
unemployment benefits may lead to upward pressure on wages and thus to a rise 
in the structural unemployment rate. Bassanini and Duval (2006) for example 
estimate that on average a ten percentage point reduction in unemployment 
benefit leads to a drop in the unemployment rate by about 1.2 percentage points. 
The argument should therefore also work for the opposite direction (rise in 
unemployment benefit leads to a rise in unemployment rate). 
Higher labor taxes for the workers as a consequence of the rising fiscal burden 
due to the downturn, may also discourage workers from searching for a job, 
leading to the same effects on the structural unemployment rate as higher 
unemployment benefits. 
Gianella et al. (2009) analyzing OECD countries and the impact factors of the 
NAIRU, find evidence that the long-term interest rate – used as a proxy for the 
cost of capital – has a significant impact on the NAIRU in all OECD countries but 
Portugal and Japan. The results they obtained suggested that the interest rate 
was a key driver of the surge in structural unemployment in the 1980’s. The effect 
they found was close to one percentage point. In times of economic downturns it 
is likely that there is a durable increase in the risk premium on interest rates 
which in turn, following the empirical results of Gianella et al. (2009), would 
increase the NAIRU and therefore negatively influence potential output. 
Other institutional settings are likely to affect the development of structural 
unemployment. The OECD has developed indicators of product market regulation 
(PMR). These indicators measure in a comprehensive and internationally 
comparable way the degree to which the states’ policies promote or inhibit 
competition in the product market where competition is viable. The indicators 
cover the state control of business enterprises, legal and administrative barriers 
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to entrepreneurship and barriers to international trade and investment.11 Gianella 
et al. (2009) find that in 14 out of 19 OECD countries the PMR indicators have a 
significant impact on the NAIRU. So in times of economic downturn a rise in the 
PMR index, stemming from strong barriers and therefore inflexibility in the 
product market, can hamper the restructuring process following a crisis.  
Minimum wages and trade unions also affect the NAIRU through their impacts on 
wages. However this effect is not very likely to change due to economic crises. 
Finally, the unemployment protection legislation (EPL) may affect structural 
unemployment. There is no consensus in the literature that this effect exists. On 
the one hand Bassanini and Duval (2006), for example, find no evidence that 
EPL has a significant impact on the NAIRU. On the other hand Furceri and 
Mourougane (2009) find evidence that in times of crises, countries with high EPL 
are likely to experience a marked rise in structural unemployment. The initial 
downturn can be damped by high unemployment legislation because it provides 
job security for workers. The long term unemployment rate, however, is 
negatively affected by stringent EPL due to the difficulties in the necessary 
reallocation of labor. 
How strong the particular effects of institutional settings on the NAIRU in times of 
crisis are is an empirical question. Furceri and Mourougane (2009) tried to 
analyze this question by looking at data from past economic crises. They first 
found clear evidence that a downturn leads to a rise in the level of structural 
unemployment. The amplitude of the effect depends on the severity of the crisis. 
In case of very severe downturns structural unemployment rises by about 1.5 
percentage points after five years. Second institutional settings affect the 
structural unemployment in the initial shock and in the adjustment process in the 
aftermath of the crisis. In particular they found that in economies with very rigid 
labor and product markets (high EPL, PMR and average replacement ratio) 
economic downturns increase structural unemployment significantly whereas 
they have not found such effects in relatively flexible economies. 
                                               
11
 See: OECD (2009c) 
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Summarizing, economic crises bear some risks for a rising structural 
unemployment rate in the long run. Thereby the destruction of human capital, real 
rigidities and institutional settings are the main dangers for a permanent higher 
NAIRU and a negative effect on potential output. 
3.1.2 Capital accumulation 
Economic crises usually lead to a decreasing demand of products and so as a 
consequence to a lower incentive for investments. So from the beginning of a 
crisis there is often a very strong reduction in the investment rate which in turn 
negatively affects the capital stock which causes a drop in the level of potential 
output in the short run. But it is not only the decline in demand but also the 
increasing cost of borrowing due to financial crises that has a negative effect on 
investment. Such an economic condition in which capital is difficult to obtain is 
called credit crunch. It arises because crises always cause uncertainty about the 
future developments of the economy and of the individual company, which leads 
to an increase in the risk premia. For companies that are not best rated it is 
nearly impossible to borrow because the lenders’ fear of bankruptcies or defaults. 
In the current economic downturn the credit crunch was very severe in some 
European countries leading to the situation that banks did not grant credits even 
to the best rated companies. Figure 4 shows that in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis the monthly growth rate of loans that was granted to non-financial 
corporations in the euro area was negative. On the one hand this can be 
explained by the credit crunch on the other hand it can partly be explained by the 
reduced demand for loans due the shortfall in demand. 
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Figure 4: Monthly growth of loans to non-financial corporations in the euro area 
 
It is quite obvious that such a credit crunch has a negative effect on capital 
accumulation and therefore also on potential output in the short-run. The effects 
in the long-rung are not that clear. However, according to the European 
Commission a longer-run adverse impact is also quite reasonable: “Given the 
realistic prospect of permanently higher financing costs and the increased risk 
that a prolonged banking crisis could impair the vital capital reallocation process 
in economies or could lead to a “re-nationalisation” of EU financial markets, there 
is a considerable risk of a longer-run adverse impact on the pace of capital 
accumulation.”12 However there seems to be a broad consensus among 
European policy makers that all essential actions have to be taken to avoid such 
a scenario. 
A crisis can also negatively affect the capital stock through a rising depreciation 
rate as the existing equipments may become obsolete due to bankruptcies or/and 
reallocations within firms and between industries. 
 
                                               
12
 European Commission (2009a), p. 13 
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3.1.3 Total factor productivity (TFP) 
Total factor productivity is a measure of the efficiency of all input factors of a 
production process. It is commonly estimated as the residuals of the production 
function and it is therefore a variable that accounts for the effects of total output 
that is not caused by the inputs. As anything else than the traditional inputs of 
production falls under TFP it is not that clear what it really measures. So TFP 
productivity is often seen as equivalent with technological progress and 
efficiency. In the economic literature TFP is often seen as the main driving force 
of (potential) output growth within an economy. It is quite important to point out 
the possible effects an economic downturn can have on total productivity as the 
development of TFP after the crisis will surely be the major determinant of 
whether the economy will achieve a full recovery or not. There is however no 
clear answer what the effects of an economic downturn on total factor productivity 
will be. On the one hand there are arguments that TFP growth will be dampened 
in the aftermath of a crisis but on the other hand also plausible reasons for a 
positive impact of a crisis on TFP exist.  
The total factor productivity levels and growth rates are traditionally higher in the 
manufacturing sector than in the service sector. In the last years there has 
already been a shift between these two industries, from the manufacturing sector 
to the service sector. As the crisis of 2008 has severely hit, for example, the 
construction and the automobile industry such affected sectors will reduce their 
activities which will cause a downward shift in the level of TFP. Furthermore, the 
crisis could also accelerate the process of the reallocation in the economy, 
leading to a permanently larger service and a smaller manufacturing sector. This 
in turn also has a negative impact on total factor productivity. However, the 
reallocation process could also positively affect TFP if countries shift the 
resources from slow-productivity industries into faster growing industries. In some 
European countries there could, for example, be a shift from construction 
industry, which has a rather slow productivity growth, to the very fast growing ICT 
(Information and communication technologies) industry. 
Another negative effect the crisis can have on total factor productivity comes 
through a slow industrial restructuring process. This process heavily depends on 
the quality and speed of rebuilding the banking sector. Otherwise credit 
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constraints will remain and potentially profitable companies with high innovative 
capacity and growth prospects will be prevented from the start-up. The financial 
system may even not be able to allocate loans as productively as before the 
crisis because projects with a high return are often linked to a high risk. Such 
projects are discouraged by more cautious lending attitudes due to the crisis. 
Granting subsidies or state aids to banks in order to restructure them, in turn can 
lead to political dependence. So highly subsidized banks favor less efficient but 
larger firms because then they might be bailed out by the government in case of 
bankruptcies. This leads to an inefficient capital reallocation at the expense of 
innovative but vulnerable firms. Further, this may induce a lower TFP level and a 
lower rate in developing new innovative technologies which in turn will cause a 
lower TFP- and so a lower potential output growth.  
R&D investments also affect total factor productivity. The effects of a crisis on 
R&D investments are less clear. On the one hand empirical literature shows that 
R&D is pro-cyclical. In bad times, especially if firms suffer from credit constraints, 
research and development spending tends to be scaled back, leading to less 
innovation and thus to a lower productivity. On the other hand it is also plausible 
that research and development is not pro-cyclical. This argument is based on the 
“opportunity-cost effect”. It states that during a recession firms have to focus on 
the most productive segments of their output due to the lower profitability. So 
labor and capital resources are often under-utilized and so the opportunity cost of 
using them to create new technologies are lower. These incentives to undertake 
R&D activities can have positive effects on total factor productivity. Another 
positive effect a recession may have on total factor productivity is the “creative 
destruction”, first introduced by Schumpeter (1942). Here economic downturns 
are assumed to have a cleansing effect on the economy by forcing the least 
productive firms out of the market during recession periods. This in turn will 
increase the average economy-wide productivity growth rate. 
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3.2 Policy responses 
The possible effects of a financial crisis on the three input factors have been 
described in the previous chapter. However, the real effect on labor and capital 
input as well as on TFP depends very much on the policy programs of a country. 
National governments or rather their economic advisors try to find the best 
responses to financial crises in order to avoid long recessions. But, history shows 
that this is a very difficult undertaking and that some countries have been more 
successful than others. In this part of the work the impacts of policy programs on 
the three input factors and therefore on potential output growth will be analyzed 
on the basis of Finland as the positive example and Japan as the negative one 
(see Figure 2). As these crises had their origins in the banking sector and had 
repercussions on the real economy a comparison with the current crisis seems to 
be possible and plausible.  
 
3.2.1 Japan 
The crisis in Japan was caused by the crash of the asset price bubble, which 
was, according to Fukao (2003), created by expansionary monetary policy, tax 
distortions and financial deregulations, at the beginning of the 1990’s. In 
connection with the crisis in Japan the phrase “lost decade” is often used in 
economic literature. A reason for the prolonged duration of the downturn is that 
there was a general optimism that once the aftermath of the bubble economy had 
been cleaned up the economy would come back to its pre-crisis growth rate path 
which had been very high compared to other economies. So in the first years 
after the crisis, in the first half of the 1990’s, national authorities adopted a wait-
and-see policy. The optimism was founded on the fact that the growth rates after 
the burst of the bubble were still positive albeit at a slower pace. The “lost 
decade” can be divided into three parts (see Figure 5): the recession of 1991-
1993, the temporary recovery of the economy (1994-1996) and the deep 
recession of 1997-1999. 
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Figure 5: GDP growth rate of Japan’s “lost decade”  
 
Concerning the monetary policy, the Bank of Japan decided to cut the discount 
rate from 6.00% to 5.50% in July 1991, as the economy began to slow down. 
Over the next four years the Bank of Japan gradually cut the discount rate, until 
the official rate stood at 0.50% in September 1995. This rate was held constant 
up to the year 2000. As shown in Figure 5, these gradual cuts in addition to the 
fiscal policy measures described below may have helped to temporarily recover 
from the downturn.  
However, regarding the whole decade, the expansionary monetary policy failed to 
achieve recovery. A reason for that is the non-performing loan problem in the 
banking sector. Due to the burst of the asset bubble many loans turned into bad 
ones, leading to huge problems for the Japanese banks. Therefore the banks 
used the low discount rate, which should actually act as a stimulus for the 
economy, to increase liquidity instead of increasing its lending. That means that 
the cheap costs of borrowing have not reached the consumers. In addition, the 
national authorities failed to achieve the essential restructuring of the banking 
system. At the peak of the non-performing loan problem in late 1997, one major 
bank and a big security firm failed, thus, with the crisis in the financial sector 
leading to a severe credit crunch, the economy went back into recession. The 
government provided capital injections for solvent banks and protections of 
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depositors of failed banks. But it failed to make the balance sheets of the banks 
more transparent and to force the banks to write off all their bad loans. 
Consequently, the public confidence in the banking system could not be 
regained. 
In addition to the monetary policy measures, Japan also provided large fiscal 
stimulus packages during the “lost decade”. In the year 1992 to 1995 the 
government formulated seven stimulus packages and major tax reductions 
leading to a temporary recovery of the economy (Figure 5). However, the 
packages were often poorly directed to unproductive public work programs and to 
small firms and industries that where no longer economically viable and so did 
not lead to a long term recovery. These ineffective stimulus packages and the tax 
cuts lead to high fiscal deficits. In order to undertake budgetary consolidation, 
perceived to be a necessity because of the rapid ageing of the population, the 
Japanese government decided to tighten fiscal spending in 1997, justified by the 
relatively high GDP growth rate in 1996. The consumption tax rate was raised 
from 3% to 5%, the special income tax reductions ended and the patient co-
payment under the national health insurance for the workers and the elderly 
increased. Furthermore, spending in public work was reduced. 
Together with the financial sector crisis described above, the Japanese economy 
slipped into a severe recession. Recognizing that the economy was not ready for 
such a fiscal tightening, the government changed its fiscal policy again. Further 
tax reductions and increases in public work were implemented to stimulate 
demand and to come out of recession. 
In addition to the monetary and fiscal policy errors mentioned above, Japan made 
significant structural policy mistakes. The Japanese authorities had great success 
in the 1980’s with their previous policy approach and thus were not willing to 
restructure the economy. Employment levels in affected industries were only 
slowly reduced and labor and capital resources were only slowly released for 
industries of the future. There was a general denial to shift resources from 
unproductive firms and industries to new, efficient ones. The overall industrial 
structure in 1999/2000 looked remarkably similar to that of 1989/1990. 
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3.2.2  Finland 
Finland’s economic development in the 1980’s and 1990’s can be characterized 
as a boom-bust cycle (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Finland’s GDP growth rate, 1981 to 2000 
 
With the deregulation of the banking sector and the financial integration of 
Finland with the rest of the world, the Finish economy experienced a strong boom 
phase in the second half of the 1980’s (Figure 6). Bank lending increased 
dramatically which was channeled to the asset market. Rising asset prices and 
real estate prices resulted in an increase in public wealth. The availability of 
cheap borrowing with zero or negative real interest rate, due to high inflation, led 
to the creation of a financial bubble. But due to the strong GDP growth the 
government was unwilling to change the monetary and fiscal policy in order to 
gain control of the expansion in demand. This evolution led to an overheating of 
the economy and to indebtedness. The debts of the private sector for example, 
doubled between the years 1987 and 1990. In the years 1989 to 1991 some 
negative external shocks changed the economic situation. There was a slowdown 
in the international economy and the European interest rate rose in 1990. The 
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collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the export earnings by 10% in 1991 and the 
Finish terms-of-trade deteriorated by more than 15%. In order to defend the 
pegged exchange rate against speculative attacks the Bank of Finland increased 
the key interest rate up to 13%. These high interest rates combined with declining 
asset values depressed domestic demand. Investment and consumption were 
reduced and as a consequence GDP fell sharply by 13% (see Figure 6). 
The decision to devalue the Finish currency 1991 and the abolition of the pegged 
exchange rate in 1992 improved the competitiveness of Finish firms and 
stimulated export growth. Without the peg the Bank of Finland was able to cut the 
interest rate which helped to stabilize asset prices and to end the deflationary 
process. By the end of 1993 the economy started a very strong recovery with 
GDP growth rates of about 4.5% on average for the rest of the 1990’s (see Figure 
6). The strong recovery was characterized by a rapid productivity growth due to 
fundamental structural changes in the economy particularly in their manufacturing 
sector. Finland restructured their economy from resource-based heavy industries 
to knowledge-based ICT industries and therefore used the economy for creative 
destruction, shifting labor and capital from inefficient firms/industries to new more 
profitable ones. In 1992, the electronic sector was smaller than any of the 
following industries: wood, metal or food. In the year 2000, however, it had 
overtaken them altogether and became the largest sector. New investments in 
machinery and equipment and spending on R&D, education and training 
improved productivity. The most prominent example for the high growth in the 
manufacturing sector is Nokia, which was the world’s biggest manufacturer of 
mobile phones in the year 2000. 
The restructuring of the economy contributed most to the high growth rates in the 
second half of the 1990’s. However, in order to solve the banking crisis and to 
reduce public deficit further policy measures were taken in the post-crisis years. 
Concerning the banking sector, the recession created large losses for the 
financial institutions. Subsequently, the government took over the savings bank 
group, which faced the largest losses and the whole banking sector was given a 
capital injection by the government to avoid a credit crunch and a reduction in the 
loan supply. In addition a government-owned asset management company 
(Arsenal Ltd.) was founded, which took over the problematic assets of the 
supported banks. The recession and the necessary support for the banking 
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sector led to a rising public deficit in Finland. In order to achieve fiscal 
consolidation and to fulfill the EMU criteria fiscal policy was tightened (increase of 
taxes and cut of spending) in the first half of the 1990’s. However, this did not 
help to reduce public debt because the reduced public spending restrained 
domestic demand and caused mass unemployment leading to higher social 
welfare spending and lower tax revenues than expected. Between the years 
1994 and 2000, Finland was able to move the public sector financial balance 
from a deficit of 6% in 1994 to a surplus of 7% of GDP in 2000. This fast 
consolidation could be achieved through the rapid growth in the second half of 
the 1990’s, the falling unemployment (from 17.9% in 1994 to 9.8% in 2000) and 
thus a decline in unemployment-related expenditures and lower payments due to 
the lower interest rate. 
3.2.3 Some comments and comparison of Finland and Japan 
In analyzing the effects of the policy measures on potential output growth in 
Japan and Finland in the post-crisis years one must take into account that the 
countries’ starting point was different. For Finland which had a very resource-
based economy before the crisis started it was easier to restructure the economy 
to a more innovation driven one than for Japan where the technology sector had 
already been very important in the pre-crisis years. Nevertheless, both countries 
were faced with the same problem, namely how to react to the decline in output 
and how to restructure the economy, shifting resources from inefficient sectors to 
more profitable ones in order to regain a sustained recovery of the economy. As 
described above, Finland in contrast to Japan used the crisis for a fundamental 
restructuring of the economy. After a steep decline of potential GDP growth in 
Finland the loss in potential output could be fully compensated in the post-crisis 
years with slightly higher growth rates than before the crisis. Japan’s potential 
growth rate reaching very high values in the 1980’s is declining since the 
beginning of the crisis (Figure 7).  
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 Figure 7: Potential GDP growth Finland and Japan, 1981 to 2009 
 
According to the European Commission (2009a), the development of potential 
output growth after a crisis heavily depends on the development of TFP growth. 
TFP growth increased in Finland due to investments in innovation and R&D 
promoted by the restructuring of the economy. Japan, however, suffered from a 
decline in TFP growth in the post crisis years caused by a drop in investments 
due to a misallocation of resources and the prolonged problems in the banking 
sector. The demographic development in Japan, the fast rise of the share of the 
elderly population, accounted for an additional burden and became the most 
important factor for the decline in potential GDP growth.  
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Figure 8: NAIRU of Finland and Japan 
 
As far as structural unemployment is concerned, Finland faced a sharp rise in the 
NAIRU in the first years after the start of the crises. The fact that Finland 
succeeded in reducing the NAIRU in the recovery period, let the long-run 
contribution to potential growth of labor market factors turn positive. In Japan 
structural unemployment did not increase significantly and thus helped not 
worsening the impact of the crisis on potential growth (Figure 8).  
 
3.2.4 Policy response of the euro area countries to the current crisis 
The current financial crisis is the most severe since the great depression of the 
1930’s. Although the origins of the crisis were in the United States in autumn 
2008 it quickly spread out to the euro area and the rest of the world. The financial 
sector was first affected but the crisis has also impacted the real economy 
through a squeeze in credit, a slump in consumer confidence and a contraction in 
world demand and trade, leading to a sharp drop in investment and output. In 
order dampen the impact of the crisis on the real economy and to ensure a strong 
recovery, the European Union announced the European Economic Recovery 
Program (EERP) for a coordinated European response to the downturn. The 
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strategic aims of the EERP are to stimulate demand and regain consumer 
confidence, to lessen the human costs of the downturn and its impact on the 
most vulnerable, to undertake the necessary structural reforms in order to be 
prepared for taking advantage when growth returns and to emerge as a low 
carbon using economy. The plan consists of an immediate budgetary impulse of 
€ 200 bn (1.5% of GDP) in order to boost demand, whereby € 170 bn come from 
the Member States itself and € 30 bn come from EU funding in support of 
immediate actions. However, as the countries of the euro area have unequally 
been hit by the crisis because of different starting conditions (regarding fiscal 
room for maneuver or labor market institutions and different economic structures) 
each country took specific policy responses. The fiscal stimulus should be timely, 
temporary, targeted and coordinated, it should be a mix between expenditure and 
revenue instruments, it should be conducted within the Stability and Growth Pact 
and it should be accompanied by structural reforms that support demand and 
promote resilience13.  
The actions taken by the Member States are broadly in line with these principles 
announced in the EERP. The coordination of the national policy responses at the 
EU level enhances their effectiveness and efficiency. The policy measures 
contain financial rescue packages, fiscal stimuli, temporary support to hard-hit 
sectors and targeted support to vulnerable groups (For an overview of the 
measures taken in euro area states see Annex 1). A reliable and efficient 
financial sector is a precondition for a healthy and growing economy. Thus almost 
every country has undertaken interventions to rebuild financial stability and avoid 
a credit crunch. Governments gave guarantees on bank borrowing and used 
public money for capital injections. All countries of the euro area provided fiscal 
stimulus packages whose sizes varied because of the different fiscal margins and 
due to the extent they have been hit by the crisis. The largest fiscal stimulus of 
the euro area, aggregated over the years 2009-2010, is run in Spain and is of the 
order of 4% of GDP. Other sizeable stimuli are undertaken in Austria (3.5% of 
GDP), Germany (3.6% of GDP) and Finland (3.8% of GDP). 
                                               
13
 For further information on the principles see: European Commission (2008) 
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In the following a closer look at the fiscal stimuli for the real economy (support for 
the labor market, for investment and business) will be taken, mainly with a view 
on the effects on potential growth. 
3.2.4.1 Support for the labor market 
According to the European Commission (2009c), 23% of all fiscal stimulus 
measures undertaken until May 2009 support a good functioning of the labor 
market and 21% of all measures were focused on the household’s purchasing 
power. The main priorities of the countries were aimed at maintaining existing 
jobs, ensuring rapid (re-) integration into the labor market and supporting the 
most vulnerable. To avoid mass layoffs due to the demand shock many firms 
implemented short-time work models that were subsidized by public funds. The 
schemes were initially limited to a certain period and to workers of specific 
sectors or firms. As they have proved to be very effective in the short-term, the 
allowance to implement short-time work has been extended in some countries 
(Austria and Germany). Most of the measures undertaken by the countries were 
intended to “improve job placement and invest in re-training” and to education 
and life-long learning. Some countries provided incentives for additional training 
activities, whereby the opportunities were expanded in most countries. Many 
actions were also taken to support employment by reducing labor costs. Tax cuts, 
especially for low-wage earners, and other incentives to work, such as tax credits 
and tax allowances for people in work were implemented. These measures, often 
targeted to specific vulnerable groups, should not only increase the attractiveness 
to work but also mitigate the impact of the financial crisis on households and 
individuals by raising their income. 
Additional social protection was given in some countries by a temporary 
extension of the unemployment benefit and by an increase in the minimum wage 
or other benefits. A first assessment of the measures taken confirms that the 
majority has a high (“measures are considered to be ambitious and 
comprehensive enough”) or medium (“measures go in the right direction but are 
limited in scope”) consistency with the principles announced in the EERP.14 
                                               
14
 See: European Commission (2008) 
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However, there are a number of measures that could be more effective by 
rendering them more comprehensive. 
The effects of the labor market on potential growth depend on the development 
of the structural unemployment rate (NAIRU). The OECD estimated in December 
2009 that the NAIRU will rise slightly in the post-crisis years in the euro area 
(2008: 7.56%; 2011: 8.58%). This increase in the short-term can somehow be 
traced back to the expected strong increase in the actual unemployment rate in 
the euro area (2008: 7.51%; 2011: 10.8). In the absence of wrong policy 
measures the NAIRU will come back to its pre-crisis level in the medium-term, 
leaving potential growth unaltered. The policy measures taken by some countries 
of the euro area bear some risks for a lasting increase in the NAIRU. If the crisis 
persists, the temporary increase in the level and duration of unemployment 
benefit or of the minimum wage to sustain the household’s purchasing power 
during the recession period can lower the incentives to work. This will result in a 
lower reallocation of jobs to more dynamic industries and thus increase the 
NAIRU. Therefore, it will be of great importance to reverse such measures and 
offer incentives to work once the recession period is over. 
The European Commission estimated that a permanent reduction in the benefit 
replacement rate by 1% could increase potential output level by 0.35% in the 
long-term15. Short-time work schemes and other measures that encourage 
flexible working time as well as all policy responses focused on the support of 
training and re-training activities are appropriate to avoid long unemployment 
which would otherwise cause a permanent destruction in human capital and so in 
turn would lead to an irreversible rise in the NAIRU and to losses in potential 
output. However, the major risk associated with the short-time working scheme is 
overstaffing, resulting in a delayed impact on unemployment once the schemes 
end. Therefore these short-term measures need to be complemented by 
measures supporting the employability. Consequently, re-training activities and 
the essential reallocation of labor resources towards more effective industries are 
very important to cut structural unemployment rate and hence let labor market 
factors contribute more to a strong potential growth in the recovery period. 
                                               
15
 See: European Commission (2009a) 
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According to the European Commission, an increase by 1% in the share of 
medium skilled workers that have been low skilled before will increase potential 
GDP by 0.04% and 0.35% in the medium-term and in the long-term, respectively. 
The effect of an increase by 1% in the share of high skilled worker (initially 
medium skilled ones) would even be higher (0.04% in the medium-term and 
0.26% in the long-term)16. 
From today’s perspective it is very uncertain if the established policies will be 
able to cut structural unemployment in the post-crisis years as most of the effects 
on the labor market can initially be seen in the upcoming years. 
  
3.2.4.2 Investment support 
Investment activities, especially private ones, have been severely hit by the 
current economic downturn. Weaker demand, tighter credit constraints and 
waning confidence led to a sharp fall in investment growth. The European 
Commission (2009d) estimates that total investment will contract by 10.7% in 
2009 in the euro area. Investment growth is expected still to be negative in 2010 
(-1.9%), before getting positive in the year 2011 (+2.1%). The countries of the 
euro area have targeted large shares of GDP at supporting investment (see 
Annex 1) whereby public support to investments was largest for physical 
infrastructure projects followed by investments focused on energy efficiency. 
Support to R&D investments was given the smallest share of the three 
categories. All the actions taken should be focused on the achievement of the EU 
climate change goals. In the EERP the European Commission17 stated that 
investments in environmentally friendly infrastructure projects, the improvement 
of the energy efficiency of buildings and the promotion of “green projects” are of 
great importance. Planned investments in R&D and education should not be 
delayed or cut as in past recessions. In fact, fiscal incentives like subsidies or 
                                               
16
 See: European Commission (2009a) 
17
 See: European Commission (2008) 
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grants should be provided to increase private investments in R&D innovation and 
education. Investments in R&D are needed to increase productivity growth and to 
improve the competiveness of Europe. Furthermore, the Commission claims that 
the industries, mainly the construction and automobile sector, which were hit the 
most by the economic downturn, should face the challenge of the transition to a 
green economy. These measures should ensure that the crisis is used for a 
necessary restructuring of the economy, helping to boost recovery and long-term 
potential growth.  
Concerning physical infrastructure, investment is focused on the transport sector 
and building and urban development. Most of the projects have already been 
planned so that they had or rather will have an impact in 2009 or 2010, 
respectively, in order to boost demand in the sort-term. The effectiveness, 
however, cannot be assured as delays in the construction sector are not unusual. 
The measures taken are broadly in line with the EERP (see Annex 1: “somewhat 
significant measures”), although there is scope for improvements. Many of the 
fiscal stimulus measures are used for traditional types of public investments 
(building roads, railways etc.) without a substantial shift towards green economy. 
According to the European Commission18 nearly 30% of the physical 
infrastructure measures are targeted to the building sector without improving the 
energy efficiency. As a result, some countries have missed the opportunity to 
reduce the high energy dependency which negatively influences potential growth.  
With regards to investments, to improve the energy efficiency most of the 
countries of the euro area have taken significant measures (see Annex 1) 
whereby subsidies to households for small-scale improvements, direct public 
investments for low-carbon or high energy-efficient public buildings were used the 
most.  
Investments in R&D, as already described in chapter 3.1.3, tend to be pro-
cyclical, meaning that spending on R&D usually drops dramatically during a 
crisis. However, such investments are very important for an increase in total 
factor productivity in the long-term and hence for a strong recovery of potential 
growth. So as to reach or even as to exceed the pre-crisis growth rates countries 
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 See: European Commission (2009c) 
Potential output and financial crises 
35 
 
have to set incentives for firms to increase, instead of reduce, their spending in 
R&D during the crisis and in the post-crisis period. To support R&D investment 
many countries of the euro area have granted subsidies and direct funding, or 
provided tax credits and loans. However, as this fiscal stimulus does not have a 
large positive effect for the economy in the short-term, it is smaller than those for 
investment in energy efficiency and physical infrastructure. As for the other 
support of investments the EERP encouraged the countries to concentrate their 
research in green technologies. This can, according to the European 
Commission19, only be found in a few states of the euro area. Regarding R&D a 
coordination, at least at EU-level, would be necessary and very important as to 
avoid research in the same field and to allow for an exchange of knowledge. 
However, such concerted actions are not planned.  
3.2.4.3 Business support 
The hard hit business sector has been given relatively large fiscal stimuli. Easing 
access to finance, a sector specific support (mainly for the automotive sector) 
and non-financial support measures are the main types being used. The main 
attention has been paid to the first category where most of the countries took 
highly significant measures. Concerning sector specific support in the automotive 
sector, a number of countries of the euro area have implemented scrapping 
schemes in order to boost short-term demand. However, these measures cannot 
account much for a recovery of potential growth as the actions taken will not be 
permanent. Regarding the non-financial measures some countries reduced the 
administrative burden and performed regulatory reforms in order to promote 
business startup. This can have positive effects on the long-term potential growth 
rate through an increase in all three input factors (labor, capital and total factor 
productivity). 
                                               
19
 See: European Commission (2009c) 
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3.2.4.4 Discussion of the policy measures 
In conclusion, the measures taken as a response to the economic downturn have 
undoubtedly had some positive effects on economic activity in the short-term. 
According to the European Commission (2010a) real GDP of the euro area 
started to grow again in the third quarter of 2009. The overall annual real GDP 
growth was -4% in the euro area. For the year 2010 the European Commission 
estimates an ongoing slow recovery with a GDP growth rate of 0.7%. The 
projections, however, remain with great uncertainty as important economic 
sectors are still not stable (e.g. turbulences on the financial markets). As regards 
the effects on potential growth, clear answers cannot be given and will appear in 
a few years. However, in comparison to the two historic crises analyzed before, 
the impact can roughly be estimated. The crucial question to be answered is 
whether the countries of the euro area are successful in increasing total factor 
productivity, the main driving force for a strong recovery of potential growth in the 
post-crisis years. The measures taken by the countries are often focused on the 
short-term, neglecting the development in the long run. Although these measures 
have been very important to cushion the impact of the crisis (keep businesses 
going, avoid mass lay-off, stimulate demand, ….), now the main focus has to be 
put on measures that can increase the overall productivity of the economy. 
Prudent attempts of the member states to restructure the economy and the 
industrial sector to a more “green” one will not be enough in order to substantially 
increase TFP. The crisis should be seen as a great chance to catch up with the 
necessary investments in “green technology” that are long overdue. An increase 
in R&D investments, education and further re-training activities are also very 
important to achieve the restructuring of the economy. This will create a lot more 
jobs, increase the capital stock and also total factor productivity leading to a very 
strong recovery of potential growth in the long-run.  
The measures taken so far are a first step in the right direction, but will not be 
enough to face such a strong recovery as the Nordic States after the crisis at the 
beginning of the 1990’s. It seems like the policy mistakes of Japan in the 
aftermath of the crisis could, however, be avoided in the current downturn. So it is 
very unlikely that the euro area will be concerned with increasing potential output 
losses in the following years. As it appears now, the scenario with a permanent 
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loss in potential output or a scenario in which the temporary losses can only be 
compensated after a very long period is most likely. 
 
3.3    Current estimates of potential output growth 
Figure 9 compares the current estimates of international institutions (IMF, OECD 
and European Commission) for potential output growth in the euro area in the 
short-term. The three institutions go together in their estimates that the annual 
growth rates declined in the year 2008 and 2009 whereby there is a sharp 
decline in 2009. The IMF estimated (World Economic Outlook database of 
October 2009), in contrast to the others, that potential growth will be negative in 
2009. For 2010-2011 all three institutions see a slow recovery of potential output 
growth, however, the pre-crisis growth rates will not be reached. The decline is in 
line with the predictions of increasing structural unemployment and decreasing 
investment activities mentioned in the previous chapter. However, as these 
forecasts are of great uncertainty, the estimates of potential output growth could 
and will be revised in the future.  
 
Figure 9: Measures of potential output growth in the euro area in the short-term 
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Figure 9 only shows the development of potential output growth until 2011. A 
direct annual comparison of medium-term scenarios (2012-2017) is not possible 
in a meaningful way, as the OECD for example only provides annual averages of 
a period for the medium-term and the forecast horizon is different between the 
three institutions. So the latest available medium-term scenarios for each 
institution will be presented separately. 
The European Commission estimated that potential growth in the euro area will 
be 1.4% in 2012, 1.6% in 2013 and 1.7% in 2014 in the euro area20. The annual 
average growth rate of potential GDP between the years 2001-2005 was 1.8%, 
meaning that until 2013 these rates cannot be regained. 
The furthest forecast is provided by the OECD, which estimated that potential 
growth in the euro area slightly recovers in the post-crisis period achieving 1.4% 
on average between 2012 and 2017 in the euro area.21 This would be less than 
the pre-crisis growth rates of 1.7% between the years 2006 to 2008.  
The medium-term development of potential output growth can also be analyzed 
using the IMF data22, that provides forecasts until 2014. Figure 10 shows the 
forecasts for the euro area for real GDP and potential GDP. Potential GDP is not 
going to recover the losses from the downturn within 2014. Potential growth rates 
remain at a lower level than the pre-crisis ones, although they are estimated to 
increase continuously (2012: 0.9%; 2013: 1.1%; 2014: 1.3%). Using this data it 
looks like that the euro area might face an increasing output loss over time. But 
as the growth rates of potential GDP are slightly increasing, there is hope that 
over the long-term this trend holds on and the pre-crisis growth rates will be 
regained or exceeded. An implementation and continuation of the right policy 
measures, described above, in order to achieve the necessary restructuring of 
the economy, to avoid a permanent increase in structural unemployment and to 
set value on R&D measures will be necessary for a strong recovery and a higher 
                                               
20
 European Commission (2010b) 
21
  OECD (2009b) 
22
  That data are taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database October 2009 
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growth path in the long-term. However, from today’s view the data confirms the 
statement in the previous sector that the scenario in which the euro area is facing 
a permanent output loss over time is most likely.   
 
 
Figure 10: Level in actual and potential output for the euro area 
 
3	
3
3	
3
3	
3
  &     &
45 45 6
*+%2 ! 
76.!  - -.)--8. 8
  
40 
 
4 Empirical part 
4.1 HP filter method 
In order to get a first own estimation of potential output for the euro area I will use 
the simple HP filter method which I have already described in the second chapter 
of the work. I use the data of real GDP from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
databases as it provides the furthest forecasts (till the year 2014)23. The range of 
the data series is from 1991 to 2014 as the maximum period. As I use annual 
data the smoothing parameter λ is considered to be 100 (according to the 
European Central Bank which also uses this value24). 
To illustrate the revisions of the forecasts of real GDP and the involved impact on 
the estimation of potential output I use four GDP series that differ in the year of 
their publication (2006 – 2009). To come up with end – point problem and 
therefore to get meaningful results of current potential output, it is very important 
to add forecasts to the real GDP series. Thus the estimation of potential output 
when using the HP filter only depends on the quality of the forecasts of real GDP. 
However, the forecasts of real GDP in turn can only be based on the information 
available in the year of their publication. So the HP filter results of current 
potential output get useless if the forecasts of real GDP have to be revised as 
more information about the future economic situation is available or were biased 
in another way. Thus, due to the uncertainty about real GDP forecasts, it is very 
likely that past estimations of potential output (using the HP filter) will be revised if 
new real GDP forecasts are available. It will therefore be shown that the past 
estimations of potential output will be revised downward when using the dataset 
of 2009 as the current financial crisis could not be taken into account in the 
former datasets. 
                                               
23
 However, in the database real GDP data is not available for the euro area, and 
therefore I had to calculate a series of real GDP with the year 2000 as the base year 
using real GDP growth and nominal GDP of 2000. 
24
 European Central Bank (2000) 
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Figure 11 shows the forecasts for real GDP (in level and growth) available in 
September 2006, October 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. The crucial 
aspect of this comparison of forecasts for real GDP is the significant downward 
revision (in level and growth respectively) in the year 2009, compared to the 
forecast of 2008. Although the crisis was already taken into account in 2008 
(abrupt, albeit short fall in real GDP growth), the severity and the long duration of 
the crisis was underestimated. In the recent forecast of 2009 the IMF estimates 
that real GDP growth will only slowly recover after the severe downturn in 2009 
and finally converge to the pre-crisis growth rates until 2014. However, the 
forecasts are of great uncertainty, because the real development of the recovery 
is subject to severe risk. 
 
Figure 11: Level (upper panel) and growth (lower panel) forecasts of real GDP 
available at different years (2006-2009) for the euro area  
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growth is represented in Figure 12. Using the dataset of 2008 potential output 
growth is only slightly decreasing in the aftermath of the crisis. In contrast, the 
current estimates of 2009 show a huge downward revision of potential growth. 
Taking the HP-filter method for estimating potential growth there is only a very 
small upward trend in the post-crisis years. In contrast to the forecast of the three 
institutions a convergence to the pre-crisis growth rates is not visible. Due to the 
lower growth rates in the post-crisis period the losses in the level of potential 
output will become larger. Thus the results of potential output gained by using the 
HP filter would correspond to the third theoretical case, potential output loss 
increasing over time, in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 12: Estimates of potential GDP growth (upper panel) using the HP-filter and 
using real GDP data available at different years (2006-2009) 
 
The short-term forecasts (until 2011) of potential output growth when using the 
HP-filter are similar to the forecast of the other three institutions, IMF, OECD and 
European Commission (see Table 1). However, relatively large deviations in the 
medium-term forecasts (all three institutions estimated that there will be a 
convergence to the pre-crisis growth rate) is attributed to the end-point problem 
of the filtering methods. To overcome this problem longer forecast series of real 
GDP would be necessary. Such long-term forecasts are, however, not available. 
#	
#
#
#
#$
#	
#
#
#
#$
  &     &





*+%2 
Empirical part 
43 
 
However, it also has to be mentioned that the forecasts of these institutions are to 
a largely extent based on judgment rather than on purely statistical approaches. 
This is particularly the case in times of vague economic times as the current one. 
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IMF 
 
1.54 1.66 1.32 -0.14 0.45 0.71 
EC 
 
1.54 1.53 1.26 0.72 0.78 1.02 
OECD 
 
1.61 1.79 1.72 1.19 0.91 0.97 
HP filter 
 
1.31 1.14 0.98 0.86 0.81 0.81 
Table 1: Comparison of own potential growth results with the estimates of the IMF, 
OECD and the European Commission 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter the forecasts of potential output 
growth using the HP-filter depend on the quality of the forecast of real GDP. As 
these forecasts have to be regarded with suspicion also the forecasts of potential 
growth are of great uncertainty. The difficulty to give the right predictions can also 
be seen by comparing the current measures of potential growth of the different 
institutions. Normally the estimates of the institutions of the same years 
converge. For the two years (2009 and 2010) following the severe downturn, 
however, the estimates differ substantially (primarily between the IMF and the 
other two institutions) compared to the pre-crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF, OECD, EC and own calculations 
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4.2 Production Function (PF) method 
4.2.1 Production function 
In addition to the HP-filter method, which is only based on a statistical filtering 
technique, the PF-function approach, that is also based on real economic 
variables, should be used for the estimation of potential output growth. As a first 
step, a form of the production function has to be chosen. Like most important 
international organizations (OECD, IMF, EC, ECB) and like the majority of 
literature dealing with this topic, the Cobb Douglas form is used in this work25.   
The Cobb Douglas case is 
Yt = F(Kt, Lt) = At * Ltα * Kt(1-α) , 
      where At is total factor productivity (technological progress), Lt is the labor 
input, Kt is the capital stock and α is the partial elasticity of production with 
respect to labor and the capital stock.  
 
4.2.2 Defining the potential input factors and potential output 
The first input factor, potential employment, is derived by using labor force data 
and estimations of the NAWRU (non-accelerating wage-inflation rate of 
unemployment). Similar to the NAIRU described at the beginning of the work, the 
NAWRU is defined as the unemployment rate consistent with stable nominal 
wage inflation. So potential labor input is defined as 
 
Ltpot = LFt* * (1-NAWRU),       (1) 
where LFt* is the HP-filtered labor force of the total economy. 
                                               
25
 an alternative concept is the CES production function used for example by Dimitz 
(2001) 
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The potential capital stock is assumed to be equal to the full utilization of the 
actual capital stock. As this series is already quite smooth there is no kind of 
filtering method necessary. That means: 
Ktpot = Kt .         (2) 
 
Finally the third and last potential input factor that has to be calculated is total 
factor productivity (At), which is determined as the residuals of the production 
function estimation. It is the part of the production function that cannot be 
explained by the two other input factors labor and capital. After rewriting the Cobb 
Douglas production function in the log-form, total factor productivity can thus be 
estimated by solving the following equation: 
at = yt – α * lt – (1-α) * kt ,       (3) 
      where yt, lt, kt and at are the logs of GDP (Y), actual employment (L), capital 
stock (K) and technological progress (A). The parameter α is equated with the 
average labor share and according the EC26 set to 0.35. In order to get rid of 
measurement errors this achieved series is being smoothed using the HP-filter 
(At* being the smoothed series). 
 
The final step to get estimations of potential output is to insert the potential input 
factors described above in the Cobb Douglas production function: 
ytpot = at* + α * ltpot + (1-α) * ktpot ,     (4) 
      with at* being the log of the smoothed (HP-filter) total factor productivity 
series, ltpot being the log of potential labor input and ktpot being the log of 
potential/actual capital input. 
 
                                               
26
 See: European Commission (2006) 
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4.2.3 Description of the data 
All the data used for the estimation process are taken from the AMECO database 
(Last update 22 October 2009) of the European Commission. This paper focuses 
on the euro area which actually consists of 16 countries (EA 16)27. Unfortunately, 
capital stock data is only available for the former euro area of 12 countries (EA 
12)28. Therefore, the following estimations could only be performed for the EA 12. 
The starting point of the data set is 1991 as earlier observations are not available. 
The database also provides forecasts of all relevant series till the year 2011. In 
the basic estimation of potential output only the original series, ranging from 1991 
to 2011, are taken and potential output is estimated for this period. In a next step 
the data set is extended till the year 2016, making assumptions about the 
development of the input factors, in order to get different scenarios of the 
possible medium term trend of potential output. 
For the calculation of total factor productivity the real GDP series, the civilian 
employment series for labor input and the net capital stock for capital input were 
inserted. For the potential values of the input factors the following data series 
were used: Potential capital input is described by the data series of actual net 
capital stock (for explanation see above). To determine potential labor input data 
series of the NAWRU and of civilian labor force – in order to coincide with the 
data series of civilian employment which was used for the estimation of TFP – 
were taken. Thereby, civilian labor force is equal to civilian employment plus total 
unemployment. The difference to the total labor force data set is that the ones 
currently serving in the armed force are not included in the civilian labor force (for 
a detailed definition see explanation to the AMECO database). 
In order to get rid of measurement errors, the data series of civilian labor force 
and total factor productivity are smoothed using the HP-filter. Therefore all the 
                                               
27
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Cyprus  
28
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain  
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problems concerning the filtering techniques (endpoint problem, quality of 
forecasts), mentioned above, are also crucial for the production function method. 
For detailed information about the input factors and the development over time 
consider the Annex 2 and 3.  
  
4.2.4 Basic estimation of potential output 
In a first step the relevant data described in the previous chapter is inserted in 
equation one in order to get an estimation of potential TFP. Figure 13 shows the 
growth rate of total factor productivity between 1992 and 2011. After the 
theoretical analysis of the possible impacts of crises on the input factors, it is not 
very surprising that in the years 2008 and 2009 there is a negative growth of 
TFP, whereby in the latter year there was a huge decline of more than 4%. 
 
Figure 13: Basic estimation –TFP growth 
Another important thing one can see on the basis of this figure is the problematic 
end point problem when using the HP-filter. Although the growth rates of potential 
TFP are supposed to be positive and rising in the years 2010 and 2011, the HP-
filtered series still plots a negative trend. Hence, the subsequent revisions of the 
trend are not taken into account. In order to get rid of this problem, forecasts can 
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be added at the end of the sample. In the next part of the paper, when different 
scenarios for the medium term are performed, one can remark the difference 
between the slopes of the HP-filtered TFP growth. 
The estimation of potential output is finally achieved by inserting the potential 
input factors (also see the Annex 2 and 3) into equation 4. Figure 14 presents the 
results for the growth of potential output. Between 2002 and 2011 the growth of 
potential GDP for the euro area is positive in all the years. However, it is 
important to mention that since the year 2000 there is a clear downward trend 
observable. In the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 there is a huge decline in 
potential growth which certainly derives from a decline in all the potential input 
factors.  
 
 
Figure 14: Potential output growth for the euro area (PF-method) 
 
As Table 2 shows that out the results of the production function estimation 
process go in line with the results of the European Commission for the pre-crisis 
period. This is not very surprising, because in this paper the data used is solely 
taken from the AMECO database of the European Commission. The deviation 
from the EC which begins in the year 2009 can partly be explained with the end 
point problem when using the HP-filter for TFP and labor force. The European 
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Commission gets rid of this by adding internal projections to the series or simply 
by judgment. Therefore the expected uptrend of the potential input factors in the 
medium and long term becomes also apparent in the HP-filtered series. The fact 
that estimations of potential growth of the current years are revised when 
projections are added to the data sample becomes apparent in the next chapter 
of the work. It must also be mentioned that the difference in the results can also 
stem from the slightly different method in calculating potential labor input29. 
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IMF 
 
1.54 1.66 1.32 -0.14 0.45 0.71 
EC 
 
1.54 1.53 1.26 0.72 0.78 1.02 
OECD 
 
1.61 1.79 1.72 1.19 0.91 0.97 
HP filter 
 
1.31 1.14 0.98 0.86 0.81 0.81 
PF-method 
 
1.53 1.47 1.20 0.43 0.31 0.38 
Table 2: Comparison of the own results with the results of different institutions 
 
4.2.5 Three scenarios of medium potential output growth 
In this part of the paper three different developments of potential output in the 
medium term (till 2016) are analyzed. In order to get such projections, 
assumptions about the input factors have been made. The scenarios vary 
uniquely in the assumptions about total factor productivity. In scenario one TFP is 
assumed to grow at the average pre-crisis growth rate. In scenario two TFP 
growth is permanently lower and in scenario three TFP growth is permanently 
higher than in the pre-crisis period between the years 2012 and 2016. 
                                               
29
 The EC now measures potential labor input in average hours worked.  For further 
discussion see European Commission (2006) 
Source: IMF, OECD, EC and own calculations 
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The other input factors are not varied among the scenarios and therefore the 
assumptions are equal. It has to be noted that the projections are based on the 
assumption that the economy is going to recover in the medium and long term 
and a further economic downturn is not going to arise. Between 2012 and 2016 
the capital stock is expected to be on the average pre-crisis growth path again. 
As a major credit crunch has been avoided and investment growth is also 
expected to turn positive in the year 2011 (see chapter 3.2.4.2) in the medium 
and long term a return to the pre-crisis path is very likely. The fact that the growth 
rate is assumed to be constant in the projection period is not very problematic as 
the path of the capital stock is smooth anyway and there are no fluctuations (see 
Annex 3.1). Therefore the growth of capital stock is supposed to grow at the 
average pre-crisis rate of 2.21%. 
For the projections of potential labor input assumptions about the NAWRU and 
the labor force have been made. For civilian labor force the growth forecasts of 
the European Commission (2009e) are used and so the series extended till the 
year 2016 (see Annex 2.1 and 2.2). The growth rate of labor force is constantly 
declining due to the problem of the quick ageing of the population. According to 
the European Commission (2009e) the growth rate of labor force will become 
negative in the euro area in the year 2020. Therefore, apart from the negative 
effects of the financial crisis on potential output growth, the European 
Commission predicts that in the long term potential GDP growth is going to 
decline30. 
Concerning the NAWRU no medium term forecasts that also account for the 
economic crisis are available. It is not that easy to predict the future development 
of the NAWRU as it normally has many ups and downs and depends very much 
on the effects of the policy measures taken. It has already been mentioned in 
chapter 3.2.4.1 that the policy programs taken by the members of the euro area 
bear some risk for a permanently higher level of the NAWRU. Therefore it is not 
assumed that the increase in the short run can be revised in the medium term. 
For the estimation of the three scenarios the NAWRU is held constant at the 
                                               
30
 For detailed information see: European Commission (2009e) 
Empirical part 
51 
 
latest available rate of 9.5% between the years 2012 and 2016 (see Annex 2.1 
and 2.2).  
With regards to total factor productivity, three different assumptions about the 
medium term development are made, leading to the following three scenarios. 
4.2.5.1 Scenario 1: average pre-crisis TFP growth  
In scenario 1 it is assumed that the actions taken to re-boost the economy will 
have a positive influence on TFP. Thus, spending on R&D will increase again and 
regain the pre-crisis level. However, the measures taken are not that effective to 
exceed the pre-crisis growth rates. Therefore there would still be room for a 
further restructuring of the economy to more productive industries or technologies 
and for more investments in R&D and education as described in chapter 3.2.4 of 
the paper. In scenario 1 TFP is supposed to grow at the average pre-crisis 
growth rate of 0.64% between 2012 and 2016 (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: Scenario 1 – TFP growth 
The black line in Figure 21 shows the growth rates of potential output for scenario 
one. In 2012 potential growth is 1.56%. In the following years the average pre-
crisis rates (between 2000 and 2007: 1.78%) are slowly regained (in 2016: 
1.71%). This development is also quite good to see in Figure 16 which compares 
the level of the estimated potential GDP with the long term pre-crisis trend. After 
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the drop in 2009 and 2010, the level of potential GDP runs parallel to the pre-
crisis trend. The losses due to the crisis will not increase but also not be 
compensated in the medium term. Therefore this scenario is equal to the 
theoretical Case 2, permanent loss in potential output level, in Figure 1  
 
Figure 16: Scenario 1 – potential GDP level 
 
4.2.5.2 Scenario 2: permanently lower TFP growth 
The second scenario describes the case that the actions taken for a restructuring 
of the economy are not efficient enough to boost total factor productivity in the 
past-crisis period. Investments in R&D and education, essential for a strong 
recovery, fall short of unproductive and useless infrastructure projects. Although 
from today’s point of view such a case is not that realistic (see chapter 3.2.4) 
possible effects of a permanently lower TFP growth in the past-crisis period on 
potential output growth should also be illustrated. For scenario 2 total factor 
productivity growth is fixed at the annual constant rate of 0.3% between 2012 and 
2016 (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Scenario 2 – TFP growth 
In this scenario potential growth is also increasing in the year 2012 and then 
slightly rising till 2016 (see Figure 21). This is due to the fact that the two other 
input factors (labor input and capital stock) are assumed to be equal in all three 
scenarios. However, in 2016 the growth rate of potential GDP is going to be 
1.5%, which is smaller than the average pre-crisis rate of 1.78%. This means that 
in the medium term the losses in potential output level will increase. Figure 18 
demonstrates this as the gap between the pre-crisis trend and the potential GDP 
line is slightly widening over time. Thus this scenario is consistent with the 
theoretical Case 3, potential output loss increasing over time, in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 18: Scenario 2 – potential GDP level 
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4.2.5.3 Scenario 3: permanently higher TFP growth 
Finally, in the third and last scenario the growth of TFP is assumed to exceed the 
pre-crisis rates and is set equal to an annual constant rate of 1% (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Scenario 3 – TFP growth 
This case should somehow be the goal which should be achieved. Investments in 
R&D and education are not cut but extended during the crisis and in the 
aftermath. In many countries of the euro area the energy efficiency of buildings 
has been improved and the research in green technologies has been expanded. 
Therefore the restructuring of the economy to more productive and innovative 
industries has been performed. In addition, concerted actions in R&D within the 
euro area or, almost better, within the European Union would further increase the 
positive output of investments in these fields. If such a development is going to 
arise, a growth rate of TFP that is much bigger (also much bigger than the growth 
rate assumed in this scenario) then the average pre-crisis rate is very likely. 
However, to be honest such a scenario appears rather unlikely given the 
incomplete stage. For such concerted actions in specific fields that can bring 
countries advantages in their economic development, the European integration 
has progressed insufficiently.  
The supreme line in Figure 21 depicts the growth of potential output until the year 
2016. In 2012 the average pre-crisis growth rate of 1.79% are nearly regained 
with 1.74%. In the following years, as in the two other scenarios, the growth rate 
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is raising, finally achieving 1.95% in the year 2016. That means that the pre-crisis 
growth is exceeded and the short term losses of potential GDP level can slowly 
be compensated in the medium term. Figure 20 shows that in the third scenario 
the potential GDP line is converging to the pre-crisis trend line. This means that 
this scenario corresponds to Case 1, no loss in potential output after some time, 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 20: Scenario 3 – potential output level 
To sum up, by varying only the assumptions about the medium term development 
of TFP growth, all three theoretical cases for the impact of a financial crisis on 
potential output could be estimated. The development of potential output in the 
medium-term will therefore heavily depend on the effects of the policy actions on 
total factor productivity. 
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Figure 21: Potential GDP growth of the three scenarios 
 
4.2.5.4 Some comments on the results 
The three scenarios describe the effects of different assumptions about TFP 
growth on potential output growth in the medium term. However, again it has to 
be mentioned that the other input factors (potential labor input and capital stock) 
are the same in all three cases. That is of course quite a strong simplification of 
the model because a higher TFP growth would/could also imply a higher capital 
stock and/or a higher potential labor input. So the most realistic result would be 
the first case as the other potential input factor series are also extrapolated by 
adding the pre-crisis rates. For the case of permanently lower and permanently 
higher TFP growth the two other input factors would have to be adjusted too. 
However, further adjustments of the input factors go beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
In chapter 4.2.4 of the work it was mentioned that the current estimation of 
potential GDP is biased, because of the end point problem when using the HP-
filter. If we compare the results of the three scenarios with the results of the basic 
estimation in the years 2009-2011, we can identify the upward revisions of 
potential growth in all three scenarios (see Table 3). So if projections are added 
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to the series we can deal with the end point problem and get estimations that are 
more similar to that of the different institutions.     
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  #$$% #$$& #$$' #$$( #$)$ #$))
IMF 1.54 1.66 1.32 -0.14 0.45 0.71 
EC 1.54 1.53 1.26 0.72 0.78 1.02 
OECD 1.61 1.79 1.72 1.19 0.91 0.97 
HP filter 1.31 1.14 0.98 0.86 0.81 0.81 
Basic estimation 1.53 1.47 1.20 0.43 0.31 0.38 
Scenario1 1.57 1.56 1.34 0.62 0.57 0.72 
Scenario2 1.55 1.52 1.28 0.54 0.47 0.59 
Scenario 3 1.60 1.59 1.40 0.70 0.68 0.87 
Table 3: Comparison of the results  
 
Source: IMF, OECD, EC and own calculations 
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5 Summary and conclusion 
According to the European Commission (2009a) three possible scenarios of the 
development of potential output in the post-crisis years are possible: no loss in 
potential output level after some time, permanent loss in potential output level 
and potential output level increasing over time. In this thesis the effects of the 
current economic crisis on potential output in the euro area are analyzed and by 
taking different assumptions about the future development of the input factors, 
three different scenarios are carried out.  
After the short introduction to the concept of potential output and the estimation 
methods, the possible theoretical effects of crises on the input factors, labor, 
capital and total factor productivity are pointed out. As the impact on the input 
factors and therefore also on potential output depends very much on the policy 
responses of the countries, the main part of the thesis deals with the actions 
taken in the current crisis in the euro area. The European Commission has 
announced the European Economic Recovery Program (EERP) right after the 
start of the crisis which should ensure a strong recovery for the European 
economy. The actions taken by the members of the euro area differ from one 
country to another. A first assessment, however, tells that most of the actions 
taken are in line with the program announced by the European Commission.  
In accordance with the policy actions finally in the last section of the paper, three 
different scenarios about the medium term development of potential output are 
carried out. The three scenarios differ in the assumptions about the future growth 
of total factor productivity which is theoretically seen as the main driving force for 
economic recovery. In the first scenario the pre-crisis rates are regained, in the 
scenario the post-crisis rates are lower and in the last one the post-crisis rates of 
TFP are higher than before the crisis. Thus all three possible theoretical 
scenarios pointed out by the European Commission could empirically be 
investigated. According to the policy actions taken it is most plausible that there 
will be a permanent loss in potential output due to the crisis. 
Due to the actuality of the topic predictions about the medium term development 
of the potential input factors are of great uncertainty. In order to get estimations I 
took assumptions that are from today’s point of view most likely. I am aware 
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about the fact that the assumptions about the medium term development of the 
potential input factors may be a bit strong as TFP, the NAIRU and capital stock 
may not grow at a constant rate between 2012 and 2016. However, given the 
uncertainty about the future development of the economy and the problem of 
data availability this is the best approach. 
A further limitation is that the three scenarios only differ in the assumptions about 
TFP growth whereas the other input factors stay the same in all three scenarios. 
To get more realistic results capital input and labor input would also have to be 
adjusted as higher growth rates of TFP will also have positive effects on labor 
and capital. However, as an adjustment of the two other input factors would only 
intensify the effects already shown in the three scenarios it is not that 
problematic. The main conclusion that the development of TFP growth depends 
very much on the policy programs taken and that TFP growth in turn has a major 
impact on the long term growth path of potential output could be shown in a 
meaningful way. 
Topics for further research would be the adjustment and variation of the other 
input factors. The rapid ageing of the population in connection with the financial 
crisis and their impact on potential growth would also be an interesting topic to 
analyze. The current budgetary problems of Greece – many other countries of 
the euro area also suffer from high public deficit – is a challenge for the whole 
euro area and could and will have a major impact on potential output. Due to the 
actuality of the economic crisis there will come future challenges for the countries 
of the euro area which could in various ways also have effects on the medium 
and long term development of potential output. 
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Abstract 
The theoretical and empirical analysis in this thesis describes the effects of the 
current crisis on potential output and its input factors, focusing only on the euro 
area. By varying the assumptions about the medium-term development of total 
factor productivity it is shown that the recovery scenario of potential output in the 
post-crisis period heavily depends on this input factor. Dependent on the 
assumption all three theoretical cases (full recovery scenario, permanent loss in 
potential output level, increasing loss in potential output level) could be found. 
Regarding the policy actions taken the most plausible case is a permanent loss in 
potential output level. 
 
Abstract (German) / Zusammenfassung 
In dieser Diplomarbeit werden theoretisch und empirisch die Auswirkungen der 
aktuellen Krise auf das Potentialoutput und deren Inputfaktoren beschrieben, 
wobei sich die Analyse auf den Euroraum beschränkt. Dabei werden zuerst die 
Politikmaßnahmen, die die Euroländer eingeführt haben, beschrieben. Anhand 
dieser Programme werden Annahmen über die mittelfristige Entwicklung der 
totalen Faktorproduktivität getroffen und dabei drei Szenarien für die mittelfristige 
Entwicklung geschätzt. Es konnten dabei alle drei theoretischen Fälle 
(Vollständige Rückgewinnung des kurzfristigen Verlustes im Level, permanenter 
Verlust im Level und größer werdender Verlust im Level des Potentialoutputs) 
nachgewiesen werden. Am wahrscheinlichsten scheint es jedoch aus heutiger 
Sicht und bei Berücksichtigung der getroffenen Politikmaßnahmen, dass es einen 
permanenten Verlust im Level vom Potentialoutput geben wird.
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Annex 1 
Overview of policy responses to the economic crisis in the euro area (from: European Commission, “The EU’s response to support the real economy during the 
economic crisis: an overview of Member States’ recovery measures”, 2009) 
  
Financial sector Fiscal policy Real economy   
Labour Market Investment Business support 
  
Guarantees Recapitalisation Total 
stabilisation 
Change in 
fiscal 
balance 
(aggregate 
over 2008-
10) 
Discretionary stimulus (aggregate over 2009-10) 
Encouraging 
flexible 
working time 
Supporting 
employment 
by cutting 
labour costs 
Retraining 
and 
activation 
Supporting 
households 
purchasing 
power 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Physical 
infrastructure 
R&D & 
innovation 
Sectoral support 
Easing 
access 
to 
finance 
  
overall 
measures 
aimed at 
households 
increased 
spending 
on labour 
market 
measures 
aimed at 
businesses 
increased 
investment 
expenditure 
  
bn € bn € % GDP p.p. change % GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP automotive tourism construction   
  
    
                                      
AT 75 15 5-10% -5.2 3.5 2.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 •     • :: •   •     :: AT 
BE 300 16.2 >10% -4.9 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.3   •   :: • •       • :: BE 
CY       -3.5 1.8 0 0 0 1.8           •   • • •   CY 
DE 449.8 106.6 5-10% -5.8 3.6 1.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 :: • :: :: :: • :: ::     :: DE 
EL 15 5 1-5% -0.8 0.3 0.3 0 0 0     • •         •   • EL 
ES 200 0 1-5% -6 4 1.6 0.1 1.4 0.9   • • :: • • • ::   • :: ES 
FI 50 0 1-5% -7.1 3.8 2.6 0 0.7 0.4     ::   • •       • • FI 
FR 320 43 1-5% -3.6 1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3   • ::   • • • ::   • :: FR 
IE 400 8.5 >10% -8.5 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.4 0     ::   •         • • IE 
IT 0 20 1-5% -2.1 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1               ::     • IT 
LU 0 2.876 5-10% -5.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.7         • •   •     • LU 
MT       1.5 1.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.6         • •     •     MT 
NL 200 36.8 >10% -7.1 1.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 • :: •   • • • •     :: NL 
PT 20 4 1-5% -4 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3       • :: •   • •   :: PT 
SI 12 0   -5.5 2.2 0 0.8 0.2 1.2 •   •     • •       :: SI 
SK       -3.2 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 •   ::   •     • •   :: SK 
1)     ECFIN/C4/REP/51326 18 March 2009 – Bank support measures and recent developments in financial markets (note for the EFC), p. 4. 
2)     Figures from Table 3 of the country fiches of May 2009 
3)     ECFIN/B3/GC-FP/D(2009) REP/51628 6 April 2009 – First preliminary assessment of employment and social policies to soften the impact of the crisis (note for the EPC), p. 9. 
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1991 120748256 130762756 3 128840395.3  8.5 	$	3	 3
1992 119615116 130769416 $3 129796567.5 3	 8.7 	3 	&3
1993 117202194 130369094 $3$ 130771963.3 "3$ 8.9 $$	3 $$	3
1994 117140908 131254208 $&&3 131795534.8 3 9 	3 $$$3
1995 117933693 131769593 $3& 132892205.5 3$$ 9.1 $	3 &3
1996 118640046 132877246 $&&		3 134081485.3 3& 9.2 $&3 &	3
1997 119713511 133970311 $	$&	3 135371658.4 3$ 9.1 $&&$3 $	$3	
1998 122252095 136011895 $	3$ 136758966.3 3	& 9 &$&3 &&		3&
1999 125125042 137864442 $$ 138225637.2 3$ 8.9 	$3 	$			3	
2000 128242759 139855959 $$$$&3$ 139746428.6 3&&	 8.7 &	&3 	&3$
2001 130248486 141328986 &	3 141292485.8 3	$ 8.5 3 &3	
2002 131167250 142982850 &$$ 142836049.7 3 8.4 $&3	 $$3	
2003 131759819 144349219 &&	 144349726 3	 8.4 $	3	 $&$&
2004 133042333 146043833 &	$3& 145807588.5 3& 8.3 $$	 $$			3
2005 134654841 147873041 &		$3	 147183706 3	$ 8.3 $&3& $&&	3&
2006 136882045 149313145 &&$3 148454509.6 3& 8.3 $	3& $$	3$
2007 139366017 150655317 &&$$3 149603323.8 3 8.4 $3	 $$&&3
2008 140500330 152018330 	$3$ 150622059.4 3	 8.6 $3$ $	3$
2009 137834896 152315396 		&3 151513147.3 3	 9.1 $3 $	&	3
2010 135821462 152295162 	$&3 152292981 "3$ 9.5 $		$3	 $	&3
2011 135737243 152397643 	&	$3 152985976.5 3 9.8 $&	3$ $$$	3


2012 	$$&3& 	$	3& 0.552 9.8 $	&3&
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2013 	$		&3 	&$$3& 0.481 9.8 $$	
2014 	&	$$3 	&&3 0.356 9.8 $	&&3&
2015 	&$3 		$3 0.268 9.8 &&$3
2016 		$&3 		$3 0.164 9.8 &	&3
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Annex 2.2 
Labor input  
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO database and own calculations 
  
74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
75 
 
#	9$
#9$
#9$
#9$
#$9$
#	9$
#9$
#9$
 &   $    	
"4/0
#
#
#&
#
#
#
#
#&
#
#
 	   &   $ 

	!4
Annex 3 
 
 
 
 
 
"4.52)#
  /0
 39$ 
 3$	9$ 3
$ 3$$9$ 3
& 3$9$ 3
	 39$ 3
 3&$9$ 3	
 3&9$ 3
 3$&9$ 3
 3$9$ 3&
 3$9$ 3	
 3		9$ 3$	
 39$ 3&
$ 39$ 3
& 3&9$ 3
	 39$ 3
 3&&9$ 3&
 3	9$ 3&
 3$&9$ 3
 3$9$ 3$
 3&&9$ 3$
 3&$9$ 3
 3&	9$ 3
$ 3	&	9$ 3
& 3			9$ 3
	 3	&	9$ 3
 3$&9$ 3
Source: AMECO database 
Own projections 
  
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
77 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
Name: 
Christoph Doleschal 
 
Date of birth: 
December 1st, 1984 
 
Place of birth: 
Linz, Austria 
 
 
Education: 
October 2005 to June 2010: Studies of Economics at the University of Vienna 
Since October 2007: Studies of Business law at the Vienna University of Economics 
and Business 
October 2004 to June 2005: Studies of Human Medicine at the Medical University of 
Vienna 
June 2003: Matura, Gymnasium Petrinum, 4040 Linz 
 
